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Recognition Within the Limits of Reason: Remarks on Pippin’s Hegel’s Practical 
Philosophy         
 
DAVID INGRAM 
Loyola University Chicago, USA 
 
Since the publication of Charles Taylor’s Multiculturalism and the Politics of 
Recognition in 1989,1  the concept of recognition has re-emerged as a central if not 
dominant category of moral and political philosophy. Taylor’s use of Hegel’s seminal 
category to defend group rights aimed at securing legal and public recognition of the 
distinctive identities of groups resonated with critical theorists such as Jürgen Habermas, 
Seyla Benhabib, Nancy Fraser, and above all Axel Honneth, who elevated the category of 
recognition to the most foundational of moral and social categories.2 Honneth, for 
example, drew on the research of developmental psychologists, such as Jessica Benjamin 
and Donald Winnicott, as well as pragmatists, such as G. H. Mead, all of whom had used 
the category of recognition to explain how a sense of self emerges from the empathetic 
identification with primary caretakers.3 The accent here on social recognition as a 
precognitive basis for individuation has been understood, in turn, as a condition for 
psychological wholeness and well-being or, more radically, as a transcendental condition 
for the possibility of any relation to the self whatsoever.  In the meantime, critics – many 
of them influenced by poststructuralists currents of thought – have argued that the 
category of recognition, with its implied identification and reconciliation with the other, 
designates an impossible and perhaps even undesirable achievement.4  
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 Perhaps they are right. For now I wish only to raise an important challenge to the 
dominant theories of recognition listed above, insofar as they claim to accurately reflect 
Hegel’s view on the matter. In Hegel’s Practical Philosophy (2008), Robert Pippin 
argues that Hegel’s mature concept of recognition is properly understood as an 
ontological category referring exclusively to what it means to be a free, rational 
individual, or agent.5  I agree with Pippin that recognition for Hegel functions in this 
capacity. However, I shall argue that conceiving it this way also requires that we 
conceive it as a political category in the sense described above. Furthermore, while Hegel 
insists that recognition must be concrete – mediated by actors who hold one another 
accountable according to institutional norms implicit in their actual social roles –  I argue, 
appealing to Hegel himself, that social crisis impels actors to transcend their roles and 
adopt abstract points of view more in keeping with philosophical forms of reflection. 
Such “alienation” – so ardently embraced by postmodernists – need not undermine the 
possibility of recognition as an ontological category, as Pippin fears, but rather comports 
with the expressivist theory of action he imputes to Hegel, which describes the socially 
recognized intentions, rationales, and identities – not to mention, freedom - of actors as 
unfolding in interminable dialog.   
 Pippin’s argument may be summarized as follows: 
1. Action is not adequately identified and explained without appeal to actor’s 
 intentions.  
2. Actor’s intentions are only manifest to him or her through other actors’ 
responses. One cannot be certain of what one has intended and what kind of a 
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person one is until after one has acted and one’s actions have been judged by 
others. 
3. The social interpretation of actor’s intentions unfolds when the actor is 
challenged to justify his action with reasons that are recognized by others. 
4. Such recognition is concrete, since the reasons in questions refer to 
institutional norms that are accepted by everyone. Recognition between actors 
implies mutual accountability but not strict equality in social status; nor does 
it require that actors feel esteemed in the eyes of the other. 
5. The agent’s successful justification of his action to others is what is properly 
meant by freedom. Recognition thus functions principally as a minimal 
condition for freedom, not as a transcendental condition for selfhood or 
consciousness.   
6. Reasons that refer to abstract ideas, purely formal norms, or hypothetical      
(counterfactual) thought experiments that completely abstract from actual 
institutional norms have no social basis and therefore cannot serve as grounds 
for social justification and recognition. 
7. Philosophy essentially offers reasons that are abstract, formal, and 
hypothetical. 
8. Therefore philosophy cannot enter into concrete social critique, informing us 
about what we ought to do; when it goes against this proscription it presents 
itself as potentially destructive. So philosophers cannot contribute to 
extending our understanding of ourselves as free agents; viz., they cannot 
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enlighten us in a way we might recognize as normatively extending our 
shared, institutional identities. 
 
In what follows I shall accept premises 1-8 as positions that are properly 
attributed to Hegel.  Premise 6 strikes me as true only if one assumes that 
counterfactual forms of reasoning completely abstract from actual institutional 
norms. Premises 7-8 are likewise conditionally true, so that if it turns out to be the 
case that social philosophy engages in formal and counterfactual forms of 
reasoning that do not abstract from actual institutional norms, then they are false. 
Premise 4 strikes me as partly questionable, since being accorded the status of 
rational agent and fellow interlocutor is a form of esteem that is constrained by 
relations of domination. Recognition therefore unavoidably carries with it a 
political connotation.  
 
     I 
 
Before delving into Pippin’s argument in detail, let me first begin by clarifying 
what he means by saying that recognition is an ontological category. To say that 
recognition is an ontological category does not imply that it is natural, 
unchanging, and given all at once with the advent of human life. Insofar as Hegel 
regards freedom, rationality, and individuality as historical achievements of the 
human spirit, recognition, too, acquires for him the status of an historical 
achievement.  Therefore, it is not properly understood as a transcendental 
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condition for the bare possibility of subjectivity, selfhood, relation to self, or self-
consciousness, insofar as these capabilities can be attributed to children as well as 
adult human beings prior to acquiring access to skill sets and institutional 
opportunities associated with rational agency. For Hegel, recognition is simply a 
necessary condition for the possibility of experiencing oneself as a free, rationally 
accountable individual (HPP, 185). 
  
 Nor is Hegel’s notion of recognition a condition of psychic wellness and self-
esteem of the sort that figures in the political struggles for recognition discussed by 
Taylor, Honneth and others. Indeed, Pippin insists that it is senseless to demand as a 
political goal, or as a matter of right, the kind of recognition Hegel is talking about, for 
that demand would be meaningless outside of any institution that hadn’t already 
actualized mutual recognition among political agents. Rather, to the extent that Hegel 
develops what Pippin calls a “recognitive politics” as an alternative to other liberal 
political rationales of a consequentialist or rights-based nature, such a politics will be first 
and foremost grounded in institutionally defined social roles, or shared identities 
grounded in concrete universal norms (HPP, 242, 250, 258, 265).6  
 In sum, no matter how important recognition might be for personal psychological 
health, basic self-awareness, and political justice between groups, it is not the sort of 
recognition that Hegel philosophically defends as the telos of fully actualized action. 
Indeed, according to Pippin, these psychological and political conceptions of recognition 
are of a different caliber entirely. A group’s achieving mutual recognition from other 
groups regarding the worth of its own members’ distinctive racial, gender, or cultural  
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identity may be a necessary condition for inter-group dialogue so essential to achieving 
political justice, understood as equality in the legal and political distribution of social 
esteem, say, but it is not, in Pippin’s reading of Hegel, a necessary condition for enabling 
the group’s members to act in a rational and responsible manner as individual agents. 
Likewise, achieving emotional bonding and identification with caretakers may be a 
necessary developmental stage in the process of becoming a fully balanced human being, 
and it may even well be that absent any such bonding at all infants could never become 
persons who experience themselves as subjects who live in a meaningful world of 
objects.7  But having been recognized in this precognitive, emotive or empathetic manner 
of identification is not part of what it means to be a rational actor.   
Pippin mentions another reason why conceptions of psychological fulfillment are 
not central to Hegel’s philosophical project. That project consists in presenting and 
defending a form of argument that is internal to free thought, or reason, itself, understood 
as radically self-determining, socially embedded, mental life (Geist). This is not to deny 
that there are natural  - and to that extent, partly pre-rational – conditions underlying 
thought and action. Hegel’s idealism does not require that he disregard the physical world 
and its impact on empirical psychology. However, explanation of human agency cannot 
be reduced to causal explanation without loss of its proper subject matter, which is 
reason, or thought, as embodied in concrete action. To the extent that practical 
philosophy forgets its proper form of idealism and adopts the external, observational and 
objectifying standpoint of empirical psychology and anthropology, it does a profound 
injustice to our inner understanding of ourselves as fully free, rationally accountable, 
agents. 
Deleted: ,
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  This explains Pippin’s discomfort with respect to left-Hegelian critiques of 
alienation. Such examples of philosophical anthropology take us away from the Kantian 
legacy back to a pre-critical Aristotelianism, where rational criticism  relies upon an 
account of human nature, understood as a prior constraint determining volition and 
thought from without.8  But, according to Pippin, to view alienation as a state of 
unfulfilled nature, as dehumanization, and recognition as restoration of psychic 
wholeness and humanity, is to think of recognition as something that is natural, always 
present in some form, however diminished, and thus as an original constraint rather than 
as a freely accomplished result. This way of conceiving recognition goes against the grain 
of Hegel’s thinking, which holds that the determinations of free action – recognition 
included - must themselves be the product of action.  
  
                                                                  II 
 Now that we have clarified Pippin’s claim that Hegel’s concept of recognition is best 
understood as an ontological presupposition, let’s look more closely at his argument 
purporting to show this to be the case.   Pippin’s main project is to defend what he 
regards as Hegel’s highly counterintuitive notion of freedom against the apparently 
intuitive traditional conception. The traditional conception conceives of freedom as a 
causal power innate within the individual. In the empiricist tradition of Hobbes, Locke 
and Hume, the will can be said to be free if its decision to pursue this or that desire is 
unhindered by external impediment. The transcendentalist tradition inaugurated by Kant 
goes further than this by reasonably insisting that the mere faculty of choice (Willkür) 
provides a poor foundation for freedom so long as the rational, calculating will remains in 
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thrall to pre-rational inclination. But Kant’s idea of a spontaneous “uncaused” volitional 
agency that inhabits some otherworldly noumenal realm while somehow acting in the real 
world is scarcely philosophically satisfying. How can mere respect for an abstract and 
empty conception of formal practical reason (the categorical imperative) motivate action, 
i.e.,  provide sufficient reason to act this way rather than that, apart from worldly desire? 
 Hegel’s solution to this dilemma involves radically reconceiving the way in which 
Kant’s idea of autonomy as self-legislation is understood. Instead of thinking of 
autonomy as simply a function of individually exercised practical reasoning, Hegel thinks 
of it as a dialogical accomplishment in which agents invest their desires in the rational 
form of validity claims whose reasonableness they then justify to other agents in terms 
that these other agents recognize and accept. 
  Hegel’s mature defense of this recognitive account of freedom (premises 1 -5 
in my reconstruction) proceeds at many levels. In the Phenomenology, his attention is 
focused on in the dialectical confrontation between the claims and counterclaims of forms 
of consciousness.  As is well known, the section of the Phenomenology in which Hegel 
discusses the dialectic of self-consciousness (culminating in the relationship between 
master and servant) disabuses us of any conceit in our own autochthony in its compelling 
account of why natural self-consciousness cannot be free on its own. This account 
rearticulates an earlier argument that Fiche had developed in his Grundlage des 
Naturrechts (1796): to wit, that autonomy first arises when human beings distinguish 
themselves from animals by transforming their immediate, natural desires into claims, or 
demands, addressed to others and requiring their recognition. The opportunity to effect 
this transformation thus depends on challenge from the other. The problem with the 
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master-servant relationship that supposedly resolves the existential struggle to the death 
between persons who demand unreciprocated recognition of their freedom is its 
incapacity to rise above the fundamental contradiction that recognition cannot be 
compelled and, indeed, cannot affirm the superior sovereignty of one when given 
unfreely from another who is deemed to be little more than an object. Although the 
servant achieves a certain awareness of his own freedom in fearing death, postponing 
satisfaction of natural need, and dominating nature through labor, neither he nor the lord 
can achieve subjective certainty of their autonomy and, indeed, cannot be free, because 
they lack the moral, legal, and ethical preconditions in which they might transform their 
immediate demands into rationally justifiable validity claims requiring mutual 
recognition. 
   This recognitive account of freedom is first developed by Hegel in a later 
section of the Phenomenology devoted to action as an expression of intention that has 
significance for others. In the section concluding the chapter on reason, entitled 
“Individuality which Takes Itself to be Real in and for Itself,”  we learn “that a person 
cannot know what he [really] is until he has made himself a reality through action” (para 
401). The “purpose” and “matter at hand” in his acting, however, comes to light only as it 
is expressed and taken up by others, thereby showing that the pure integrity of one’s 
willing is a chimera. Agents may “pretend that their actions and efforts are something for 
themselves alone in which they have only themselves and their essential nature in mind,” 
but “in doing something, and thus in bringing themselves out into the light of day, they 
directly contradict by their deed their pretense of wanting to exclude the glare of publicity 
and participation by all and sundry” (para. 417).  
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 Finally, in chapter six, subsection (c)  entitled “Spirit that is Certain of Itself: 
Morality,” we encounter this dialectic of rudimentary communicative interaction played 
out on a higher register – the register of social critique, if you will. Dealing not with the 
abstract determinants of rational action (means and ends) but with the ostensible purity of 
moral conscience, Hegel emphatically shows that the subjective convictions of moral 
agents remain essentially incomplete and indeterminate in meaning – lacking in 
conviction and objective reality - until they are expressed in actions and not only declared 
in a self-validating way but justified convincingly with reasons before other persons 
whom the actor recognizes as having the right to judge (paras. 645, 653). Although the 
forms of consciousness that inhabit this moral world only recognize their own subjective 
convictions - the result of having seen behind the emptiness of applying a Kantian 
universal law of reason that transcends any determinate subjective prescription  -  there is 
a sense in which each asserts his own convictions as normatively binding for everyone 
else, as if one’s inner voice had the same authority as God’s command (paras. 655-56).9 
Acting as if his subjective conviction were universally binding for society, the spectator-
judge (who, for the purposes of this essay, can be compared to the inactive philosopher-
social critic or inactive community of  political deliberators)  accuses the acting agent of 
hypocrisy by showing that the meaning of the agent’s actions is not, contrary to the 
agent’s beliefs, exhausted by the agent’s claimed moral intentions, since from the 
subjective perspective of the judge’s convictions, these actions appear to have been 
morally motivated by such evil, egocentric desires as fame and ambition (para. 665). But 
in coaxing a confession of wrong from the agent, the hard-hearted judge -  who in playing 
the “beautiful soul” refuses to act for fear of getting her own hands dirty - can scarcely be 
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said to claim with convincing conviction that she and not the actor is right,  and indeed 
can also be accused of hypocrisy for betraying a commitment to universal right by 
withdrawing into the inner sanctum of her own subjective self-certainty (paras 658, 663-
65). Forgiveness comes when both actor and judge mutually confess their hypocrisy and 
recognize their mutual accountability to one another in the course of both simultaneously 
playing out the dual role of actor and judge. Realizing that deliberative judgments and 
action-oriented convictions must be backed by reasons that can be communicated to and 
validated by others heals the wounds of past recrimination, for it enables actor and judge 
to acknowledge the inextricable connection between subjective conviction and social 
recognition, acting out of singular self-interest and reconciling that rationale with a social 
judgment affirming that rationale’s universal worth (paras. 667-71).  
 To paraphrase the moral of this story in a way that Hegel might have accepted 
had he lived in our post-Wittgensteinian world, we could say that the reasons given by 
agents for acting and judging do not count as reasons unless they can enter into a 
language game of challenge and justification in which they are recognized as compelling 
by others. Any gap between agent’s and judge’s assessment of what the agent did marks a 
gap in recognition and, therewith, a gap in the agent’s own certainty that what he or she 
thought she did is what he or she did in fact; and that experience of self-alienation is 
tantamount to an experience of unfreedom, or absence of self-determination.10      
 Pippin relies on Hegel’s mature writings in the Philosophy of Right and in the 
Encyclopedia to flesh out the implications of this conception of recognitive freedom 
further.  The important points developed in these writings are as follows:  If freedom, or 
taking ownership of one’s inclinations, volitions, and intentions – requires transforming 
Deleted: he
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these subjective events into rationally justifiable validity claims addressed to and 
recognized by others (as Habermas would say) – then it also requires an intersubjectively 
recognized framework in which asserting and redeeming individual claims makes sense. 
That framework is the modern state, understood not merely as government but as shared 
political understanding firmly anchored in what we today would loosely identify as a 
liberal and democratic ethos.  In other words, it is only within a modern state that 
objectively recognizes individual freedom and responsibility through legal institutions 
such as private property, accountable legislative representation, and so on and further 
grounds these formal institutions in substantive traditions expressing common values, 
aims, and meanings as well as concrete narrative identities based on intersubjectively 
recognized roles, that something like genuine individual self-ownership can happen.   
 A further point bears mentioning with regard to this institutional conception of 
practical reason. Justification will be constrained by – or, to put in the more positive 
terms favored by Pippin and Hegel, reconciled to – particular social roles and functions; 
in other words, justification will not be free to methodically detach itself from these roles 
as if aspiring to become a formal test for determining how any rational speaker or hearer 
or actor or judge would justify the action in question. 
 
 [T]he reflection and deliberation essential to such a subjective dimension (the 
 entertaining of considerations about what one ought to do) are not formalizable, 
 do not involve a method or permanent set of moral rules or a moral law or any 
 sort of moral calculation. One deliberates, as he [Hegel] says, “qua ethical being” 
 (sittliches Wesen). This means that considerations such as “because I am her 
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 father” or “because that is what a good businessman does,”  or “you cannot, 
 because that is my property,” or “because I am a citizen” simply are practical 
 reasons. They are not initial steps requiring a full deduction of a further claim 
 that, say, one ought always to do as is required of a modern citizen of a 
 Rechtsstaat, all before a subjectively offered reason could really be convincing or 
 successful. The Kantian conception of autonomy and rationality that supports 
 such an intuition is, Hegel claims, a dangerous fantasy (HPP, 274). 
  
 The philosopher’s temptation to think that there must be some more general, abstract 
reason supporting the social functional reasons proffered by everyday agents is simply 
mistaken, for such a reason could not provide a motive for acting that would be more 
concretely meaningful and prescriptive than the reason institutionally provided. Thus, 
Habermas’s formal pragmatic account of accountability, in which actors also play 
institutionally unconstrained abstract social roles of speaker and listener apart from their 
institutionally constrained social roles of, say, doctor and patient, adds nothing to the 
sorts of specific claims and justifications that a doctor might raise or make with respect to 
a patient. In justifying the truth of a diagnosis or the rightness of a prescribed regimen of 
care to the patient the doctor should not have to appeal to a general theory of knowledge 
or a general moral theory. “Grounded in controlled observation” or “cost-beneficial” or 
“in accordance with respecting the inherent dignity of the human being” are not reasons 
that would conceivably justify a concrete judgment taken in abstraction from the 
particular institutional context.11 Radically questioning the truth of science or the 
appropriateness of medical practice is merely the idle fancy of philosophers who are free 
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to adopt wholly abstract and transcendent notions of rational justification, truth, and 
rightness in their “professional” capacity as purely rational speakers and listeners, 
unencumbered by the constraints of action. 
 
      III 
  
 We are now in a position to restate premises 6-8 of Hegel’s argument. Pippin’s 
Hegel thinks that the recognitive nature of historically situated rational agency limits the 
kinds of reasons we can bring to bear in criticizing social institutions, in two respects.  
According to Pippin’s Hegel, we are not entitled, as rational agents, to engage in 
hypothetical (or counterfactual) arguments, if the form the argument takes is that we 
could not consent to these institutions as purely rational beings, viz., beings whom we 
imagine are free to reason without being constrained in their thinking by actual social 
institutions.12 This kind of thought experiment is either vacuous or meaningful in a 
dangerous way,  in that it invites individuals to imagine that they are being impartial 
when they are in fact imposing their own subjective opinions on the rest of us without so 
much as making a token gesture on behalf of what the rest of us, who participate in and 
identify with society and its norms, might think. 
  Such formal reasoning – with its implicit subjectivism and volunteerism –is the 
reverse side of that pre-critical, substantive reasoning advanced by Aristotelians. This 
reasoning, which rejects the formalist appeal to ideal procedure in favor of an intuitive 
appeal to substantive human capacities, implies a form of moral realism that contradicts 
the self-legislating nature of rational moral agency. 13  
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 So both formal and substantive criticism, Pippin maintains, would be regarded by 
Hegel as “external” to the internal, participatory standpoint of rational agents whose 
justificatory reasons are in some important sense determined (or delimited) by the 
concrete logical space of the historically finite ethical life (Sittlichkeit) they inhabit.  If 
the justificatory reasons for social critique proffered by contractarian proceduralists and 
communitarian realists are ruled out as philosophically incoherent and practically 
“dangerous” (perhaps even “pathological,” as Pippin sometimes suggests), it might then 
seem that Pippin’s Hegel could at least allow reasons that criticize the existing ethos 
immanently, for failing to live up to its underlying telos (or idea). This is true for Hegel, 
but only with qualification: we cannot understand such reasons as including a claim that 
individuals are entitled by right to such an ethos. 
  According to Pippin’s Hegel, to demand as a right the actualization of the social 
conditions underlying one’s agency – where such conditions are understood to include 
the having of rights - is philosophically incoherent, in that it “puts the cart before the 
horse” (HPP, 257). It makes no sense to claim a right to the presuppositions for claiming 
a right.  Claiming a right to the presuppositions for a claiming a right would lead us down 
a bottomless pit of demands. Furthermore, the presupposition for claiming rights – 
mutual, unconstrained recognition between persons who hold one another accountable as 
claimants – is not the sort of thing that can be legally enforced in the way that rights 
claims must be if they are to count as rights.  How does one compel free recognition of a 
claim without committing a performative contradiction?14  
 Once again, recognition is here seen as an ontological condition, not an object of 
political struggle undertaken in the name of advancing rights, even though recognition 
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itself plainly rests on a political institution incorporating the principle of rights. However, 
if the ordinary political activity of claiming and justifying rights is not what originally 
brings the principle of rights into existence in the first place, it might be asked: What is? 
For Hegel, that answer, of course, is history. It is history – not abstract reason – that 
justifies this activity; and it is historical, dialectical philosophy – not abstract, 
counterfactual philosophy – that interprets the logical course of events.   
      
 
 
                                                                        IV 
 
I will examine whether Hegel’s historical justification of modern rights – as stated above 
– is sufficiently dialectical and convincing. Presently I wish to focus on another question: 
Can Pippin’s Hegel consistently exclude abstract, counterfactual reasoning from the 
recognized play of practical arguments in everyday life? A glance at Pippin’s favorable 
comparison between Hegel’s account of concrete rational accountability and that 
contained in Robert Brandom’s Making it Explicit (1994)  suggests that it cannot.      
 Brandom’s inferentialist account of action posits intersubjectivity as a prior 
condition of rational agency. Persons hold one another accountable for the commitments 
that can be inferred from the assertions they make about themselves, others, and the 
world around them as they interact with others. They are entitled to these commitments 
only to the extent that others can rely on them in fashioning their own commitments. But 
Brandom understands the role that communication plays in this process as mainly 
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passive; we listen to what others say, observe what they do, and keep score of who is 
committed to what, being ever vigilant to ferret out conflicting or inconsistent 
commitments. It is important for me to be able to take over another’s commitment, 
although doing so does not guarantee that what I and that other person understand by that 
commitment is identical (for each of us inserts that claim into our own unique inferential 
system of commitments).   
 Importantly, in Brandom’s account of accountability, agreement in 
understanding is not a full-bodied dialogical achievement of the sort that Pippin attributes 
to Hegel recognitive account of freedom. On Brandom’s account, entitlement to a 
commitment will depend on consistency with the dominant commitments of one’s 
society. But entitlement in this sense can be determined by simple observation, in the 
same way that a jury (to cite Habermas) keeps a tally of the points scored by the 
defendant and the plaintiff in a trial.15  Nothing in Brandom’s account of entitlement 
requires that agents actively acquire assent from others by justifying their commitments 
in the face of direct challenges. 
 On the other hand, Brandom’s commitment to objectivity and truth should 
incline him to embrace a more robustly dialogical rendering of entitlement.16 Achieving 
objectivity in one's understanding would seem to require testing one's taken-for-granted, 
subjectively held assumptions in the crucible of dialogical questioning. Furthermore, in 
asserting our claim to be valid as a matter of objective truth we imply that all persons 
could be rationally persuaded to accept it. Of course, we cannot assume that any given 
dialogical exchange of arguments would ever suffice to exhaustively justify the truth of 
any controversial claim once and for all. Real dialogs are imperfect vehicles for 
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conclusively establishing anything, since there are always arguments and points of view 
that have not been expressed.  This has led Habermas to conclude that the idea of truth 
anticipates a temporally unlimited, viz., fully inclusive, fully free, and fully equal 
exchange of arguments, what he sometimes refers to as the ideal speech situation.17 
          The implication of this counterfactual ideal notion of dialogical accountability for 
a recognitive theory of practical reason would seem to be something of the following: 
Being able to recognize oneself as a fully rational agent depends on recognition from 
others who relate to one in the dialogical role of “equal interlocutor,” but such 
recognition appears to be, in retrospect,  always constrained and temporally incomplete. 
This accords with Pippin’s expressivist view of action: full self-certainty – or full self-
ownership – of what one is doing depends on what an indefinite number of our fellow 
interlocutors decides one is doing according to an ever-changing matrix of shared 
reasons. One’s agreement with others in this open-ended process of dialogue would be 
achievable, if we can be forgiven the expression, only in the fullness of time itself. One's 
rationale for one's actions may be recognized by others sufficient to permit a modicum of 
rational self-certainty, but this recognition could not in principle be conclusive, because 
the ideal preconditions under which it could be met are never given.  
 
                                    V 
 Recognition thus appears to be simultaneously factual and counterfactual, given but, in 
retrospect, not fully so. Because it is not given, it cannot be accomplished within the 
parameters of finite ethical life, if what one understands by ethical life is time-bound 
conventional reason. But this conclusion would appear to contradict Hegel’s own 
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optimistic claims about the fully realized fact of freedom for those participating in the 
actual institutions that make up the modern state.18 What these claims suggest is a 
complete reconciliation with the modern state as it currently exists, based on 
unshakeable, viz., final and absolute, reasons about who we are and what we are doing. 
Such triumphalism  has led Honneth and Habermas, for instance,  to conclude that Hegel 
jettisoned the forward-looking, dialogical account of rational justification so strikingly 
evident in his System of Ethical Life and First Philosophy of Spirit dating back to 1802-
04 for the backward-looking, monological justification present in the  Jena 
Phenomenology of Spirit of 1807.  Beginning with this latter work, Hegel putatively 
defends the absolute incarnation of reason; viz., a final true understanding of ourselves as 
completely free, by direct appeal to humanity’s inevitable, divine-like march to the 
modern state, behind the backs of agents and quite independently of any dialogical 
reflection they might have undertaken in enlightening themselves about the imperfect 
rationality of their social relations.19 
 One therefore suspects that the cunning of reason (List der Vernunft), as Hegel 
understands the developmental logic underlying history, has its own rationale that far 
exceeds the reasons of finite acting subjects. To say that this rationale compels 
submission  - on pain of one’s being rendered less of a rational agent – suggests that a 
person could not in principle freely and with reason elect to excuse himself or herself 
from the prevailing discourses in which he or she is expected to render a rational account. 
From the standpoint of the radical dissident who questions the presumed freedom, 
symmetry and consensuality of rational dialog as well as the impartiality of the dominant 
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lingua franca, the expectation that he or she give rational account to others  might well 
appear to be an unreasonable – externally imposed – demand.    
. Now, Pippin might respond to this objection in the following way (HPP, 276). 
Unless one buys into the implausible view that norms, such as the equality of all persons 
as bearers of fundamental rights, are facts of reason that have existed in all societies since 
time immemorial, albeit in partial or distorted, or unclear form, then one is inescapably 
thrown back onto some grand narrative about historical progress in justifying such norms.  
 Common knowledge has it that Hegel here commits a kind of genetic fallacy; that 
he conflates historical necessity, historical possibility, or historical facticity with what is 
morally right. But the normative ethos that informs our modern understanding of what it 
means to be rational is not simply the result of a kind of natural fate or metaphysical 
cunning of reason, as my earlier objection would have it. Following Pippin’s reading,  
Hegel seems to be distinguishing between a developmental logic – the telos of collective 
action, if you will – and its actual historical realization. Because the telos of collective 
action can be philosophically discerned only after the fact of its substantial if indeed 
imperfect actualization, it cannot be what motivates (behind the backs of historical 
agents) its own realization. Rather, that work is the achievement of historical “agents” or 
persons who are on the way to becoming agents in the fullest sense of the term. 
 So the proper way to interpret Hegel’s account of the actualization of reason is 
to stress the role that imperfectly rational social agents play in “freely” constituting, in 
some unintended way, their own agency across time. The fuller meaning of their action 
unfolds over time, with the philosopher as interlocutor-judge dialogically questioning and 
partly contributing to the action’s objective meaning. Although, as our discussion of 
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moral conscience shows, the philosopher judge cannot be a mere spectator, but must also 
act and be held accountable to the historical agents whose actions she in turn is judging – 
to recall Marx’s famous third thesis on Feuerbach, the educator must be educated by 
those s/he educates – the philosopher nonetheless acts in a distinctly theoretical; viz., 
philosophical way. From the retrospective standpoint of the philosopher, history can be 
interpreted as if it were the culmination of a developmental logic. Following Pippin’s 
reading of Hegel, that logic itself does not pre-exist the actions of historically agents, as 
though in the beginning that logic, rather than their incompletely actualized, still all-too-
subjective intentions causally explained their actions. Rather, we are to understand that 
incipient intentional actions, with their still undeveloped practices of mutual 
accountability unintentionally produced, through aggregate effects extending across 
many generations, something that we today recognize as more fully intentional and 
rationally individuated activity. 
 
     VI 
This account of reflective action guiding its own self-actualization has much to 
recommend it. But we still need an account of social crisis that explains how such action 
arises, with all of its progressive, emancipatory potential. Take the example of the 
dissident who refuses to reason about society in the way that conventional roles would 
dictate. Hegel is not claiming that one must always account for one’s action by appeal to 
conventional roles, least of all when the rules and terms of the game of rational dialog are 
suspected of being less rational than what they purport to be. This situation arises in 
moments of social breakdown, when our ethical identity is shattered and we seem torn 
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between conflicting social roles. Hegel’s famous gloss on Sophocles’ portrayal of the 
conflict between Creon and Antigone  in the Phenomenology illustrates the breakdown of 
an imperfectly rational ethos in which roles of citizen and family member cannot be 
harmonized because neither citizen nor family member can give a satisfactory rationale to 
the other that could justify what he or she is doing. Contrast this breakdown with our 
modern form of social crisis. In a modern society that has incorporated robust rational 
accountability all the way down to its core, individuals identify with their multiple social 
roles less rigidly and dogmatically. Our cultural conflicts don’t lead to a wholesale 
abandonment of rational accountability toward others, even if they produce skepticism 
and alienation. Such skepticism now appears to be reasonable to the extent that 
questioning oneself – impelled by challenges from others –is “natural” and finds 
institutional support. One draws from science in questioning law; or one draws from 
religion in questioning science.  It doesn’t matter that the sources of socially recognized 
reasons aren’t strictly universal, so long as there remains at least one overarching 
institutional support – such as respect for basic human rights – that is. When  respect for 
abstract morality and its concrete embodiment in the concrete civil and political rights of 
a particular nation diminishes – as is the case with modern forms of ideological 
fundamentalism –  so does respect for modern reason.      
 So defending Hegel against the charge of conservatism is certainly possible 
when we realize that abstract moral reflection itself is institutionalized in modern 
societies for whom social crisis itself has become a permanent, if somewhat tamed, 
condition. Again, suppose one of the instituted language games in our society is a 
language of human rights that functions, in part, as a common basis for holding other 
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nations rationally accountable and, in part, as a common lingua franca for disputing and 
resolving moral claims between rival religious and secular groups. Persons who are asked 
to render an account of their behavior in terms of the reasons afforded by this language 
game are asked to do so in ways that any rational human being might accept.  The 
universal validity they claim for their reasoning will require that they abstract from the 
particular ethos they inhabit, or at the very least, hypothetically imagine the possibility of 
such abstraction. That is to say, they must be able to hypothetically free themselves from 
the limits of their own ethos and even (perhaps) radically question this ethos. 
   Now, Hegel might reserve the right of the philosopher to hypothetically 
question say, the modern enlightenment ethos, as he and generations of critical theorists 
have done; but like the late Wittgenstein, he probably wouldn’t deem this to be an 
entirely appropriate reflection on the part of everyday citizens.20 Note that the problem 
with this kind of totalizing ethical reflection has nothing to do with foundationalism. 
Radical questioning doesn’t require suspending all our practical judgments at once. 
Having exorcised the bogeyman of presuppositionless certainty, we can still question our 
ethos dialectically, from within its circular course of reasoning. Rawls, for example, 
never denied that his counterfactual contractarian thought experiment, which was aimed 
at extrapolating general principles of justice for criticizing society, was anything more 
than a stylized rational reconstruction of commonly shared fixed judgments with respect 
to the acceptability or unacceptability of particular practices.  
 Regardless, then, of whether one agrees with Rawls’s theory of justice and his 
peculiar framing of the argument in support of it,  the counterfactual reasoning it exhibits 
is not obviously alien to our modern ethos. Therefore, conceding that average citizens, 
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too, can be entitled to a fair share of reasonable philosophical skepticism as their modern 
birthright, it seems unclear why Hegel would reprimand them for demanding the 
actualization of that ethos. If the answer is that doing so would enmesh them in some 
kind of self-referential paradox of the sort that Russell and other analytic logicians were 
keen on exposing, then that response would surely be one that a dialectician such as 
Hegel should be wary of giving. If the circular relationship between condition and 
conditioned, part and whole, subject and object exhibited a good and proper modality of 
infinite reflection – rather than a bad infinite regress of the sort that  foundational 
reasoning enmeshes us in  – then Hegel would have no grounds for complaint.   
  
     VII 
 
 So what is Hegel’s beef with liberalism’s empowerment of individual moral 
conscience? Hegel does not mean to extinguish the individual moral agent’s legitimate 
right to demand rational justification of what contingently exists. The danger in such a 
demand – what makes it unreasonable and pathological – is its absolute withdrawal from 
the public realm of social accountability into the private realm of fanatical self-certainty. 
Pathological is the self-imposed alienation and self-reification that comes from forgetting 
or willfully denying, in an act of bad faith, the social preconditions underlying one’s own 
claim to be rationally certain and justified. As noted above, this kind of pathology is not 
inherent within counterfactual forms of moral reasoning. Even the apparently 
monological thought experiments deployed by Rawls - and even (somewhat surprisingly) 
by no less a critic of monological critique as Habermas himself -  have a dialogical side, 
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as both of these thinkers have emphatically reminded us.21 But this fact about psycho-
social pathology underscores yet another problem in Pippin’s reading of Hegel, which is 
that recognition cannot be entirely divorced from considerations of esteem and 
fulfillment that Honneth and others consider integral to that account. Hegel’s endearing 
epithets for pathological withdrawal from society into the inner recesses of self-certainty 
- “unhappy consciousness,” “hypocrisy,” “beautiful soul,” “fanaticism,” and “absolute 
terror” - suggest that the highway of despair traversed in his phenomenology of spiritual 
enlightenment goes well beyond the philosophical experience of performative self-
contradiction to encompass a personally felt identity crisis.  In fact,  freedom 
recognitively redefined is just another word for being affirmed  and  esteemed by one’s 
fellow consociates as a fully accountable, responsible agent. What is rationally good and 
rationally right converge, so that autonomy does not come at the expense of 
psychological satisfaction and fulfillment. 
 
     VIII 
 To be sure, there is much wanting in Hegel’s account of modernity. Aside 
from its Eurocentrism, its whiggish,  triumphal account of human freedom collides with 
our post-Foucauldian  understanding of how meaning and identity are constituted and 
constrained by hidden power relations. This understanding brings to bear a distinctly 
modern skepticism that is not without a trace of that dangerous philosophical abstraction 
which Hegel so strongly criticized. Indeed I would venture to say that the philosopher 
today, in the form of the postmodern author, conceptual artist, or editorial columnist, has 
become a world historical agent, and not - as in the case of Socrates – a mere symptom of 
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crisis and decline. We moderns have become philosophical actors, reflecting from a 
distance on the meaning of who we are and what we are doing. Our interminable project 
of actualizing our free agency in dialogical confrontation with the other condemns us to 
self-uncertainty in a way that Hegel, perhaps, had but an inkling.  
 Indeed, it might be argued these days that our existential ethics of freedom 
as authentic self-ownership is as much anti-subjective as it is subjective, confirming the 
worst of Hegel’s fears. But the counterfactual, aesthetic imaginary behind such efforts of 
go-it-alone self-affirmation (or go-with-the-flow self-denial) is probably, as Hegel 
suspected, ontologically rooted in the mundane political ethos wherein we still seek 
recognition from others, come what may. The delusions of a few Robespierres and 
Nietzsche-inspired futurists notwithstanding, the revolutionary experiments in fascist and 
communist social engineering of the modern era are less a testimony to philosophical 
imagination gone amuck than they are a reflection of a pathological ethos that has failed 
to break away from the habits of long-standing tradition. Pippin himself concedes this 
point when discussing the counterfactual thought-experiments proposed by Kantians like 
Rawls and Habermas. True to Hegel’s thinking, these thinkers appealed to historical 
arguments in showing how the moral intuitions of European-descended peoples were 
rational responses to four hundred years of religious and class struggle. Their thought 
experiments were thus only devices for reconstructively clarifying (rather than justifying) 
modern substantive ethical intuitions. That said, it was precisely these types of 
generalizing interpretations and their accompanying counterfactual idealizations that 
inspired women, workers, and marginalized minorities to imagine otherwise the dominant 
institutional roles preventing them from being recognized as full-fledged agents in the 
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game of rational deliberation. All of which suggests that the struggle for recognition is 
not so far removed from that mutual dialogical questioning that marks recognitive 
political life in Pippin’s sense of the term.  
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